

POSGRADO EN CIENCIA POLÍTICA
SEMINARIO GENERAL DE INSTITUCIONES POLÍTICAS

Profesor: Gabriel L. Negretto

Créditos: 12

Objetivo del Seminario

Este seminario ofrece un estudio en profundidad de los principales temas y conceptos relacionados al análisis comparado de las instituciones políticas. El seminario comienza con una discusión acerca de los diferentes conceptos y metodologías que existen en el estudio de las instituciones, la distinción entre instituciones formales e informales y la relación entre efectos y orígenes de las instituciones. A partir de la segunda parte comienza el análisis institucional sustantivo propiamente dicho, con una revisión inicial de carácter general acerca del concepto de constitucionalismo, los regímenes constitucionales, y los tipos de democracia constitucional. En las dos secciones siguientes se analizan las dos dimensiones centrales en torno a las cuales varían los regímenes constitucionales: la dimensión electoral y de distribución de poderes. Respecto de la primera, se estudiarán los distintos sistemas electorales para elegir legislaturas y ejecutivos, así como los efectos inter e intra-partidarios de las reglas electorales. En la sección siguiente se discuten las decisiones fundamentales que definen a un sistema político democrático: los poderes del estado y la relación entre ellos tanto horizontal (i.e. separación de poderes) como vertical (i.e. federalismo). El curso termina con una discusión sobre temas abiertos y actuales en el estudio de instituciones políticas, como son sus causas y efectos y el análisis de instituciones en regímenes no democráticos.

Al finalizar el curso los estudiantes conocerán los principales conceptos y perspectivas teóricas para el estudio de instituciones políticas comparadas así como sus alcances y limitaciones; las distintas opciones para estructurar el poder del Estado y las consecuencias que ellas tienen para la representación, la estabilidad, la eficiencia y la gobernabilidad.

Evaluación: el curso consta de quince sesiones que se llevarán a cabo semanalmente con una duración de 3 horas. La asistencia puntual a clase es imprescindible. La evaluación consistirá en presentaciones escritas (30%) para discutir en clase y un trabajo final (70%).

I.- Perspectivas del estudio de instituciones (2 sesiones)

Sesión 1. Introducción, concepto de instituciones y perspectivas (institucionalismo histórico y estratégico)

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Barry Weingast, "Rational Choice Institutionalism." En Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds.) *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2006. "Rational Choice Institutionalism". En R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder y Bert A. Rockman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 2, pp. 24-38.
- Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton University Press, 2004, Caps. 1 y 4.
- Moe, Terry. 1990. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 6: 213-253

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- Hall, Peter and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44: 936-957.
- Douglass North. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press, 1990, Capítulo 1.
- Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," en *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1999 2: 369-404
- Knight, Jack. 1992. *Institutions and Social Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mahoney, James. 2000. Path Dependence in Historical Sociology. *Theory and Society* 29(4): 507-548.

Sesión 2. Instituciones como estructuras y como comportamientos. Mantenimiento y cambio institucional

Bibliografía

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- Shepsle, Kenneth. 1986. "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions." En Herbert Weisberg (ed.), *From Political Science: The Science of Politics*, pp. 51-81.
- Randall Calvert. 1998. "Rational Actors, Equilibrium and Social Institutions," en Jack Knight and Itai Sened, eds. *Explaining Social Institutions*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

- Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. 2006. "Introduction", en Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (eds.), *Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons From Latin America*, Baltimore, MI: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. 2010. "A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change." In *Explaining Institutional Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, 13–37. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Recomendados

- Jack Knight, "Models, Interpretation and Theories: Constructing Explanations of Institutional Emergence and Change," en Jack Knight and Itai Sened, *Explaining Social Institutions*. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1998.
- Kathleen Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis, en James Mahoney y Dietrich Rueschmeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003: 208-240.
- Levitsky, Steven. 2012 "Informal Institutions and Politics in Latin America," in Deborah Yashar and Peter Kingstone (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Politics*. London: Routledge, pp. 88-100.
- North, Douglas y Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England". *The Journal of Economic History*, vol. XLIX, no. 4, pp. 803-832.
- Mahoney, James. 2003. "Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis". En James Mahoney y Dietrich Rueschmeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press: 337-372.

II.- Constitución, regímenes constitucionales y tipos de democracia (3 sesiones)

Sesión 3. Constitución, constitucionalismo y democracia.

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Gabriel Negretto, "Constitutions", en *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Gale, 2007.

- Holmes, Stephen. 2012. "Constitutions and constitutionalism". En Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó. eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law*. Oxford University Press.
- Elster, Jon "Introduction," en Jon Elster y Rune Slagstad, *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Weingast, Barry. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *American Political Science Review*, 91 (2): 245-263.
- Sheldon Wolin. 1994. "Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy", en J. Peter Euben, John R. Wallach and Josiah Ober, eds., *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 29-58.

Recomendados

- Vernon Vogdanor, "Introduction," en Vernon Vogdanor, ed., *Constitutions in Democratic Politics*, 1-13. Aldershot, U.K.: Gower Publishing, 1988.
- Russell Hardin, "Why a Constitution?" In Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman (eds.), *The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism*. New York: Agathon Press, 1987.
- Vile, M.J.C. (1998 [1967]), *Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers*, ed., Indianapolis, Ind., Liberty Fund. Caps. 1.
- Adam Przeworski. 2014. *Self-Government in Our Times*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Sesión 4. Regímenes constitucionales: presidenciales, parlamentarios y mixtos.

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, Cap. 2, pp. 26-48.
- James Madison, *El Federalista*, Federalistas # 47-51.
- Bagehot, Walter, *The English Constitution*, Ithaca N.Y. Cornell University Press, 1971, pp. 59-81; 150-182.
- Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," en Arend Lijphart, ed., *Parliamentary vs. Presidential Government*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 142-149.

Recomendados

- Colomer, Josep. 2006. "Comparative Constitutions", en *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, editado por R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, y Bert A. Rockman, pp. 217-238.
- Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey *Presidents and Assemblies* (New York, Cambridge University Press 1993), Caps. 1-2
- Giovanni Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: and inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes*, New York: New York University Press, 1994. Caps. 5, 6 y 7.
- Negretto, Gabriel. 2003. 'Diseño Constitucional y Separación de Poderes en América Latina,' *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 1, 41-76.
- Negretto, Gabriel L. and José Antonio Aguilar. 2000. "Rethinking the Legacy of the Liberal State in Latin America: The Cases of Argentina (1853-1912) and Mexico (1857-1910)," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, pp. 361-97.

Sesión 5. Tipos de democracia constitucional.

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, Caps. 2 y 3.
- Powell, G. Bigham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, Caps. 1 y 2.
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism." *British Journal of Political Science* 25(3): 289–325.

Recomendados

- Riker, William. 1988. *Liberalism versus Populism*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Colomer, Josep. 2001. *Political Institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

III.- Sistemas electorales, efectos partidarios y representación (3 sesiones)

Sesión 6. Sistemas electorales I : Definición, componentes y clasificación de sistemas electorales

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell, "Introduction to Electoral Systems", en Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, eds. *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, Cap. 1.
- Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Electoral Behavior*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Cap. 2
- Taagepera, Rein. 2007. "Electoral Systems". En Carles Boix y Susan Stokes (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 28, pp. 678-702.
- Negretto, Gabriel. 2013. "Sistemas Electorales", en Mikel Barreda (ed.) *Las Instituciones Políticas de las Democracias Latinoamericanas*. Madrid y La Paz: Huygens-Plural.

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- Pippa Norris. 2004. *Electoral Engineering. Voting Rules and Electoral Behavior*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Mathew Soberg Shugart y Martin Wattenberg. 2001. "Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology", pp. 9-24.
- Farrell, David M. 2001. *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction*. Palgrave.
- Giovanni Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering: and inquiry into structures, incentives and outcomes*, New York: New York University Press, 1994. Caps. 1, 3 y 3.

Sesión 7. Sistemas electorales II : efectos sobre el sistema partidario y la competencia electoral

Requeridos

- Duverger, Maurice. 2012. *Los Partidos Políticos*. Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 231-282.
- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count*. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems, Cap. 11.
- Taagepera, Rein. 1999. "The number of parties as a function of heterogeneity and electoral system." *Comparative Political Studies* 32 (5): 531-548.
- Negretto, Gabriel L. (2015). "From Duverger to Rokkan and Back: Progress and Challenges in the Study of Electoral Systems." *Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions*: 113-127.

Recomendados

- Taagepera, Rein. 2011. *Predicting Party Sizes*. Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*.
Riker, William. 1986. "Duverger's Law Revisited". In *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequences*, edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, 19-42. New York: Agathon Press.
- Amorim Neto, Octavio, and Gary W. Cox. 1997. "Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (1): 149-174.
- Clark, William, and Matt Golder. 2006. "Rehabilitating Duverger's theory. Testing the mechanical and strategic modifying effects of electoral laws." *Comparative Political Studies* 39 (6): 679-708.
- Stoll, Heather. 2008. "Social cleavages and the number of parties: How the measures you choose affect the answers you get." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (11): 1439-1465.

Sesión 8. Sistemas electorales III: emisión del voto y efectos intra-partidarios

Requeridos

- Katz, Richard .1985. Intraparty preference voting. En *Electoral laws and their political consequences*, editado por Bernard Grofman y Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press, pp. 85-103.
- Carey, John and Matthew Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral

Formulas”, *Electoral Studies* 14: 417-439.

- Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Comparative Electoral System Research: The Maturation of the Field and New Challenges Ahead”, en Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, eds. *The Politics of Electoral Systems*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, Cap. 2.

Recomendados

- Cain, B., Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M. (1987). *The personal vote: Constituency service and electoral independence*. Harvard University Press.
- Ames, B. (1995). Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 406-433.
- Moser, R. G., & Scheiner, E. (2005). Strategic Ticket Splitting and the Personal Vote in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 30(2), 259-276.

IV.- Distribución de poderes : ejecutivo-legislativo

Sesión 9. Poder Ejecutivo: presidentes, primeros ministros y ejecutivos duales

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, Cap. 7.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, Cap. 4.
- Shugart, Matthew S. and Stephen Haggard. 2001. “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems.” In *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 64–104.
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- Cheibub, José Antonio y Fernando Limongi. “Legislative-Executive Relations”, en Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon, eds. *Comparative Constitutional Law* 2011.
- Rhodes, R.A.W., *Executives in Parliamentary Governments*, en The Oxford Handbook of Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2007, Cap. 17.
- Negretto, Gabriel. 2004. “Government Capacities and Policy Making by Decree in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Argentina.” *Comparative Political Studies* 37(5): 531–562.
- Cheibub, Jose Antonio, Zachary Elkins, y Tom Ginsburg, “Still the Land of Presidentialism? Executives and the Latin American Constitution, en Detlef Nolte and Almut Schilling-Vsacflor, *New Constitutionalism in Latin America: Promises and Practices*. London: Ashgate, 2012, pp. 73-98.
- Howell, William, *Executives-The American Presidency*, en The Oxford Handbook of Institutions, Oxford University Press, 2007, Cap. 16.
- Charles Cameron. 2004. *Veto Bargaining*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sesión 10. Poder Legislativo: congresos y parlamentos, unicameralismo y bicameralismo

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Michael Laver. 2008. “Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context”, en Donald Wittman y Barry Weingast, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.
- Rasch, B. E, Shane Martin, Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Parliaments and Government Formation: Unpacking Investiture Rules*. New York: Oxford University Press, Cap. 1.
- Tsebelis, George and Jeannette Money, *Bicameralism*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, Capítulo 1.
- Patterson, Samuel y Anthony Mughan, “Senates and the Theory of Bicameralism”, en Patterson, Samuel y Anthony Mughan, eds. *Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World*. Ohio State University Press, pp. 1-31

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- Gary Cox, 2006. “The Organization of Democratic Legislatures.” En Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Political*

Economy.

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- Gary Cox, Matthew McCubbins. 2007. *Legislative Leviathan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Scott Morgenstern, Benito Nacif (eds.). 2000. *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sesión 11. Justicia constitucional: origen, estructura y modelos

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton y John Jay. 2001 (1780). *El Federalista*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. No. 78.
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- Navia, Patricio and Julio Ríos-Figueroa, "The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America." *Comparative Political Studies*, 2005. vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 189-217.

Recomendados

- Montesquieu. 1997 (1748). *Del Espíritu de las leyes*. México: Editorial Porrúa. Libro 11, Capítulos I-VII (pp. 102-110).
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Sesión 12. Rendición de cuentas, más allá de la elección de representantes y la separación clásica de poderes

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, y Susan Stokes. 1999. "Elections and Representation", en Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Bernard Manin (eds.), *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Anita Brewer, "Institutions of Direct Democracy and Accountability in Latin America's Presidential Democracies", *Democratization*, Vol. 14. No. 4: 554-579
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- Shugart, Matthew, Erika Moreno, y Brian Crisp. 2003. "The Accountability Deficit in Latin America", en Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna (eds). 2003. *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Recomendados

- Ackerman, Bruce. 2008. La nueva separación de poderes. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica
- Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna (eds). 2003. *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, New York: Oxford University Press.
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Sesión 13. Federalismo y descentralización

Bibliografía

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- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, Chap. 10.
- Riker, William, *Federalism*, en Greenstein y Polsby, (eds.) *Handbook of Political Science*, No. 5 pp.93- 172.
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Recomendados

- John Ferejohn, Jenna Bednar y John Eskridge. 1999. "A Political Theory of Federalism". En *Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule*, John Ferejohn, Jack Rakove and Jonhathan Riley (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Filippov, Mikhail, Petero Ordeshook, Olga Shvestova. 2004. *Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Brian Galligan, "Comparative Federalism," en *The Oxford Handbook of Institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, Capítulo 14.
- Edward Gibson (ed.). 2004. *Federalism and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Tulia Falleti. 2010. *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press

V.- Temas actuales (2 sesiones)

Sesión 14. Causas y efectos de instituciones (1). El origen y cambio de las instituciones. El problema de la endogeneidad.

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Riker, William. 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule," *American Political Science Review* 74: 432-446.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2004. "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition* 39(4): 527-540.
- Shvetsova, Olga. 2003. "Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects." *Constitutional Political Economy* 14(3): 191-212.
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- Grief, Avner y David Laitin. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4):633-652.
- Carey, John. 2000. "Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6/7): 735-761.
- Alexander, Gerard. 2001. "Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 13, No 3: 249-270.
- Levitsky, Steven and Murillo, María Victoria. 2009. "Variation in Institutional Strength." *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 12.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2007. "Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible?". En Carles Boix y Susan Stokes (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*.

Sesión 15. Causas y efectos de instituciones (2): Instituciones en regímenes autoritarios

Bibliografía

Requeridos

- Jennifer Gandhi. 2008. *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press, Introducción y Cap. 1.
- Negretto, Gabriel. 2014. "Authoritarian Constitution-Making: The Role of the Military in Latin America", en Tom Ginsburg and Alberto Simpser, eds. *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Milan Svoblik. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, Introducción.

Recomendados

- Erica Frantz and Natasha Ezrow. 2011. *The Politics of Dictatorship: Institutions and Outcomes in Authoritarian Regimes*. Lynne Rienner.
- Andreas Schedler. 2014. *The Politics of Uncertainty*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 2010. "Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War ". New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-36.